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Love is heterosexual-by-default: Cultural
heterosexism in default prototypes of romantic
love
Sapphira R. Thorne , Peter Hegarty and Erica G. Hepper
School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Cultural heterosexist ideologies assume heterosexuality to be the default norm. Four
studies investigated when concepts of romantic love are heterosexual-by-default
(N = 685). In Studies 1–2, participants generated features of romantic love, in general
(i.e., the default prototype) or among one of three sexual orientation-specific couples
(lesbian, gay, or heterosexual). Heterosexual-identified participants’ default prototypes
were more similar to heterosexual than same-gender prototypes (Study 1). Lesbian- and
gay-identified participants’ default prototypes were more similar to both heterosexual
and gay male than lesbian prototypes, whereas bisexual-identified participants’ sexual
orientation-specific prototypes were equivalently similar to the default (Study 2).
However, heterosexual-identified participants rated presented features of love similarly
across sexual orientation-specific conditions (Study 3). In a timed feature-verification task
(Study 4), participants categorized fewer peripheral features of romantic love as relevant
to same-gender than mixed-gender couples. Activating sexual orientation-specific
representations affected subsequent default concepts of romantic love. We discuss
implications for heterosexism theories and intervention.
Aman and his sonwere away for a trip. Theywere driving along the highwaywhen they had a
terrible accident. The man was killed outright but the son was alive, although badly injured.
The sonwas rushed to the hospital andwas to have an emergency operation. On entering the
operating theater, the surgeon looked at the boy, and said, ‘I can’t do this operation. This boy
is my son.’
When presented with this ‘surgeon riddle,’ only half of participants correctly guess
that the surgeon is the boy’s mother (Reynolds, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2006, see Hegarty,
2017, Studies 3–4 for recent replication). This classic riddle can confuse people, who
automatically construct categories as being populated by prototypicalmembers of those
categories by default (Bodenhausen & Peery, 2009; Rosch, 1975). People often construct
concepts inways that assume certain characteristics (e.g.,White,male, heterosexual) that
gowithout saying (Bodenhausen&Peery, 2009; Hegarty, 2017). The surgeon riddle tricks
readers who automatically construct a representation of ‘the surgeon’ as aman in the final
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sentence, only to find that at the end it clashes with the image of the man who died in the
third sentence. Because such automatic category activation can go unnoticed, people
often fail to resolve the riddle.
The present research concerns defaulting, but in regard to the sexual orientation of
romantic couples rather than the gender of surgeons. Four studies examined the contexts
in which people do and do not conceptualize romantic love as heterosexual-by-default.
Herek’s (2007) concept of cultural heterosexism suggests that such defaulting may
reinforce heterosexist attitudes at the individual and societal level. Such defaulting in
category activation can be understood by Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory.
Both are introduced below.
Cultural heterosexism
Cultural heterosexism is a socially structured ideology that disadvantages sexual
minorities, via assumptions that people are heterosexual-by-default, and that homosex-
uality, when acknowledged, is ‘unnatural,’ exceptional, and requiring of particular
explanation (Herek, 2007). The concept overlaps considerably with heteronormativity,
which was also used in the 1990s to refer to the erasure and othering of non-heterosexual
identities that occurs when general categories, but in queer theory (see Seidman, 1991;
Warner, 1993). Queer theorists in the 1990s took on the task of rooting out concealed
heteronormative ideologies (see Turner, 2000 for a history). Queer theory was deeply
indebted to Foucaultian critiques of the psychological disciplines as an operation of
ideological power/knowledge (see e.g., Butler, 1990; Halperin, 1997; Sedgwick, 2008),
and it had limited impact on social psychology during this period (see Minton, 1997 for a
notable exception). Thus ‘cultural heterosexism’ and ‘heteronormativity’ have overlap-
ping meanings, but very different intellectual histories. Heteronormativity has since
come to take on a wider range of meanings in the interdisciplinary literature (see Marchia
& Sommer, 2019). Our preference for ‘cultural heterosexism’ here reflects more the fact
that this paper is psychological in its scope, than any particular difference between these
two terms that both aim to name this oppressive ideology. In this context, the
psychological term is the more parsimonious one that makes no false promise of an
interdisciplinary conversation. We have described howmaterialist feminismmay be used
to diffract this seeming impasse between cognitive analysis of concepts and the
interdisciplinary demands to queer theory elsewhere.
Cultural heterosexism works through laws, language, institutions, and individual
thoughts and attitudes (Herek, 2007). In its emphasis on defaults, cultural heterosexism is
psychologically similar to such constructs as androcentrism (Bailey, LaFrance, & Dovidio,
2019),White privilege (McIntosh, 1988), and cisgenderism (Ansara&Hegarty, 2012). Like
these other defaulting ideologies, cultural heterosexism can affect individuals’ thinking
aboutwhich people and groups are implicitly represented by categories, such as ‘women’
(Butler, 1990), ‘citizens’ (Bell & Binnie, 2000), ‘family’ (Kitzinger, 2005), and ‘Black men’
(Petsko & Bodenhausen, 2019). As such, cultural heterosexism entails failing to consider
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or queer (LGBQ+) cultures as cultures in their own right (Lauretis,
1991), and attributing group differences by sexual orientation as residing in LGBQ+
individuals (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001).
The cultural heterosexism concept suggests that same-gender couples might still be
conceptualized as exceptional, and heterosexual couples as the default, even in the
context of equal marriage laws. Social behaviour that is newer, uncommon, lower status,
unexpected, or perceived as less-than-ideal can all appear to require particular
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explanation (Bruckm€uller, Hegarty, Teigen, B€ohm, & Luminet, 2017). Heterosexual
relationships are historically older, more common, higher status, and reflected in cultural
ideal scripts such as gender complementarity (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Consistent with the
cultural heterosexism concept, recent media accounts of divorce rates explain same-
gender couples’ divorces against the background norm of opposite-gender couples’
divorces almost all of the time (Hegarty, Szczerba, & Skelton,2020).
Category norms
We argue that ideologies such as cultural heterosexism might impact cognition (see also
Bailey et al., 2019) both through the graded structure of categories and the ways that
categories areactivated. Graded structure refers to the notion that categorymembers vary
in how prototypical they are (Rosch, 1973). For example, a robin is a more prototypical
bird than a penguin. As such, cultural heterosexism may render heterosexual category
members more prototypical than LGBQ+members in long-termmemory representations
of romantic love. In addition, heterosexual forms of loving may be activated more readily
than LGBQ+ forms when thinking about ‘romantic love.’ Kahneman and Miller’s (1986)
category norms theory argues that both the graded structure of category knowledge in
long-term memory and the activation of accessible exemplars determine what becomes
the normative, taken-for-granted assumptions about a category. Category norms are
working-memory representations evoked by reference to a specific category (e.g.,
surgeon). Such references recruit themost accessible exemplars from long-termmemory
(e.g., male surgeons). The accessibility of such exemplars is influenced by their
prototypicality, but also by recently activated knowledge. For example, recent thoughts
about an unrelated female doctor might affect how a person interprets the surgeon riddle.
Category norms also differ from prototypes because category norms’ modal values
become implicit in working memory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Thus, this theory
provides a cognitive understanding of how and why heterosexuality could become the
default representation of love in many, but not all, circumstances, and that defaulting
might pass unnoticed.
Ideologies may influence category norms by determining their contents. As well as
prototypical and recently activated exemplars, category norms are more likely to contain
members of more numerous groups and higher-status groups (e.g., men, White people,
and heterosexual people; Hegarty & Bruckm€uller, 2013). For example, participants tend
to explain empirical differences between groups by focusing on factors particular to
women, ethnic minorities, or LGBQ+ individuals – evidencing the normative status of the
complimentary higher-status groups. This paper does not aim to weigh up which factors
might make heterosexual love the norm. Rather, we examine how cultural heterosexism
might be a consequence of category knowledge and category activation processes. Little
research has yet tested whether similar social identity defaulting occurs in perceptions of
emotion categories (but see Johnson,McKay, & Pollick, 2011). However, evidence shows
that people have prototypes of romantic love, which include diverse traits that vary in
their centrality (Fehr, 1988; Fehr & Sprecher, 2009; Regan, Kocan, &Whitlock, 1998; see
alsoRosch&Mervis, 1975).Hence, the activation and implementation of theseprototypes
may be susceptible to heterosexist category norms. Indeed,many past studies of romantic
love conceptualizedheterosexuality as the default relationship statuswithout justification
(Thorne, Hegarty, &Hepper, 2019). The present studies examine if cultural heterosexism
(Herek, 2007) can be extended to concepts of romantic love, by studying prototypes of
romantic love through the lens of defaulting-to-heterosexuality. Our research question is
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whether ordinary people conceptualize mixed-gender love as beingmore similar to ‘love’
in general than same-gender love, due to processes of category norm activation.
The present research
Four studies examinedwhen romantic love is conceptualized as heterosexual-by-default.
Since the work of Rosch (1977), category prototypes have been studied through feature
generation, typicality ratings, and timed feature classification tasks, including the
prototypical structure of lay concepts of love (e.g., Fehr, 1988; Regan et al., 1998) and
relationships (e.g., Fitness & Fletcher, 1993). The present research uses this prototype
approach to examine concepts of romantic love across sexual orientation target groups
for the first time. Following classic prototype research we asked participants to recruit
features of romantic love (Studies 1–2), rate their prototypicality (Study 3), and judge their
inclusion in the category under time pressure (Study 4). We examined participants’
default concept of love (e.g., Regan et al., 1998), as well as sexual orientation-specific
concepts that referred to heterosexual, lesbian, or gay male couples. Our primary
heterosexual-by-default hypothesis predicted that default concepts of lovewould overlap
to a greater extent with heterosexual-specific concepts than with either lesbian-specific
or gay-specific concepts. We also examined the boundaries of this effect in terms of
participant groups (Study 2) and recent category activation (Study 4).
Study 1: Feature generation among heterosexual participants
Heterosexual participants retrieved features associated with romantic love frommemory
in one of four conditions (feature generation). In these conditions, the couple was
unspecified (i.e., default condition) or was specified by one of three sexual orientations
(i.e., heterosexual-specific, lesbian-specific, or gay-specific conditions). All participants
were heterosexual-identified. We predicted that their heterosexual-specific concepts
would have amore similar graded structure to the default concept thanwould either their
lesbian- or gay-specific concepts.
Method
Participants
Previous studies indicate a sample of 200 is sufficient to identify a prototypical structure
(e.g., Fehr, 1988; Regan et al., 1998). Via research websites, social media, and snowball
sampling we recruited 583 respondents for a study on perceptions of romantic love –
there was no mention to sexual orientation-specific romantic love in recruitment. Of the
583 respondents, 329 left the survey incomplete. Attrition was significantly higher in the
lesbian- and gay-specific conditions (59%) than the default and heterosexual-specific
conditions (52%; v2(1) = 4.34, p = .04). We excluded participants whose sexual
orientation was non-heterosexual (n = 35) or unreported (n = 12). The final sample
comprised 207 heterosexual participants (77% female; aged 16–73, M = 23.42,
SD = 8.76).1 Details of participants’ self-identified ethnic backgrounds are presented in
Table 1.
1Removing the one self-identified non-binary participant did not change results.
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White British 13 12.56
Hispanic 11 10.63
African American 10 9.66
White and Irish 4 3.86
Asian 3 2.90
Black 3 2.90
White European 3 2.90







Unique terms 61 29.47
Study 2
White 52 25.74




Southeast Asian 5 2.48
British 3 1.49
Vietnam 3 1.49
African American 2 0.99
Chinese 2 0.99
Hispanic 2 0.99
White European 2 0.99
Unique terms 55 27.23
Study 3








Asian Indian 2 1.30
Black African 2 1.30
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Materials and procedure
The online survey software randomly assigned participants to the Default (n = 63),
Heterosexual-Specific (n = 51), Lesbian-Specific (n = 47), or Gay-Specific (n = 46)
condition.2 In the default condition, participants read the following prompt adapted
from Regan et al. (1998):
We would like you to think of the concept of romantic love between heterosexual
people, or how heterosexual people experience love. Romantic love has a number of
different features or characteristics. Some of these featuresmay be very central (important
or essential) to the experience of romantic love. Other features may be less central to
romantic love –we don’t automatically think of themwhenwe think of the state of ‘being
in romantic love’. These features can include a range of emotions, feelings, thoughts,
behaviours, actions or events and can range from positive to negative. Wewould like you
to list as many features of romantic love as you can. We remind you to think about love
between heterosexual people when making your list of features.
In the sexual orientation-specific conditions, participants were additionally prompted
to think about the respective target group (e.g., opening sentence for the gay-specific
condition: ‘Wewould like you to think of the concept of romantic love between gaymen,
or how gay men experience love’). Participants were provided with an open-ended text
box and engaged with this task for at least 5 min.
Among several metacognitive and demographic items (see Supplementary Materials),
participants selected which one of four options best described the type of relationship
they were thinking about during the task (heterosexual relationship, homosexual
relationship, other relationships, other things). We refer to this variable as ‘Relationship




White European 2 1.30
Unique terms 55 35.71
Study 4




Black African 2 1.79
British Pakistani 2 1.79
White English 2 1.79
White European 2 1.79
Unique terms 24 21.43
Note. A small number of participants in Study 1 (n = 3), Study 2 (n = 4) and Study 3 (n = 2) did not
provide details of their ethnic background.
2Due to the withdrawal rates from the lesbian- and gay-specific conditions, replacement rates were higher in these conditions.
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Table 2. The top 50 generated features and the percentage of participants in each condition generating
each feature
Default Heterosexual-specific Lesbian-specific Gay-specific
1 Happiness 37 23 13 18
2 Trust 23 18 13 14
3 Spend time together 23 17 11 9
4 Caring 20 14 13 11
5 Sexual activity 18 12 14 13
6 Romance 19 22 7 9
7 Kissing 19 17 8 12
8 Touching/Holding 20 17 8 10
9 Support 20 11 9 11
10 Commitment 10 13 11 16
11 Communication 14 14 11 8
12 Kindness/thoughtfulness 9 11 10 11
13 Honesty 15 6 9 10
14 Intimacy 16 8 10 6
15 Companionship/Friendship 11 9 9 8
16 Passion 9 8 9 10
17 Smiles Laughter 11 11 4 7
18 Chemistry 9 11 5 8
19 Do special things for each other 9 15 3 6
20 Unity/completeness/fulfilment 11 5 4 11
21 Sexual attraction/desire 6 13 2 10
22 Fidelity/loyalty 7 12 4 7
23 Acceptance/tolerance 8 9 5 8
24 Caresses 11 11 3 5
25 Empathy 7 4 9 10
26 Affection 8 11 6 4
27 Attachment Bond 8 6 11 3
28 Miss other/want to be together 9 12 3 3
29 Excitement 10 9 4 4
30 Security 13 4 4 4
31 Arguments 9 5 7 3
32 Personal sacrifice 16 6 0 2
33 Making compromises 8 6 6 3
34 Closeness 8 4 4 7
35 Mutuality 5 5 4 7
36 Fun 8 4 3 6
37 Respect 5 8 3 4
38 Shared interests 4 6 4 6
39 Marriage 3 9 2 6
40 Want to please other 9 7 3 1
41 References to gender/sexuality 1 0 11 8
42 Jealousy 8 7 3 1
43 Warmth 8 5 3 3
44 Devotion 8 8 1 1
45 Daydreaming/thinking of other 7 9 1 1
46 Silliness 8 5 3 1
47 Nervousness 7 5 5 0
Continued
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Coding
Open-ended responses were coded in two stages. First, the lead author classified
responses into 2,814 items, breaking complex responses into multiple items. Responses
stating that love is ‘love’ (n = 26) were excluded. Two independent judges, blind to
condition, categorized the remaining 2,788 items into the 119 codes described by Regan
et al. (1998), and an Other code included items that did not fit within Regan et al.’s
scheme. Both judges devised and agreed upon 26 new codes for the Other items, and
reliably coded the items into the resulting 145 categories (Krippendorff’s a = .82). Most
discrepancies were resolved, but when not possible the first judge’s codes were used.
Unique responses generated by only one participant that could not be classified into one
of the 145 categories (n = 151) were excluded from analysis. The number of participants
generating each feature at least once per condition was calculated; these feature




A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between conditions in the number of
features generated (F(3,203) = 3.90, p = .01, g2 = .06). Simple-effects analyses, with
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons,3 indicated no significant differences
between the default condition (M = 11.38, SD = 5.94) and any sexual orientation-
specific conditions (ps > .10). Trends indicated a higher number of generated features in
the heterosexual-specific condition (M = 12.08, SD = 5.41) than the lesbian-specific
(M = 9.09, SD = 5.01; t(96) = 2.68, p = .009, d = 0.56) and gay-specific conditions
(M = 9.24, SD = 5.01; t(95) = 2.58, p = .01, d = 0.51). However, these simple effects
were non-significant after correction. No other comparisons were significant (ps > .10).
To test our main hypothesis, we examined frequencies of specific features across
conditions (Table 2; see Supplementary Materials for full list). We calculated Spearman’s
Rho correlations between feature frequencies in each of the four conditions, taking the
feature as the unit of analysis (Table 3). All correlations were moderately strong, positive,
and significant, showing considerable overlap in the graded structure of prototypes across
conditions. Fisher’s Exact Z-Test showed that feature frequencies in the default condition
correlated more strongly with those in the heterosexual-specific condition than with
those in the lesbian-specific (z = 3.67, p < .001) or gay-specific conditions (z = 3.33,
p < .001). Feature frequencies in the default condition correlated similarly with those in
Table 2. (Continued)
Default Heterosexual-specific Lesbian-specific Gay-specific
48 Obsession/infatuation 7 8 1 0
49 Comfortable 8 5 2 0
50 Sympathy 4 1 7 3
3We use Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons throughout.
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the lesbian- and gay-specific conditions (z = 0.34, p = .73). As predicted, heterosexual-
specific concepts of romantic love resembled the default concept more than the lesbian-
and gay-specific concepts did.
To describe this difference between concepts further, chi-square tests compared the
frequencies of all 41 featuresmentionedby at least 10%of participants in the heterosexual-
specific condition to feature frequencies in the lesbian- and gay-specific conditions. After
Bonferroni, frequencies differed for two features (personal sacrifices and references to
gender and sexuality). Participants generated significantly fewer references to gender
and sexuality (e.g., ‘knowing the needs of a female,’ ‘same as heterosexuals basically’) in
the heterosexual-specific condition (2%) than the lesbian-specific condition (23%;
v2(1) = 13.45, p < .001) but not the gay-specific condition (17%; v2(1) = 9.67, p = .002).
Relationship focus
Participants’ self-reported focus during the task varied by condition (Table 4). As few
participants (5.8%) indicated thinking about ‘other relationships’ or ‘other’, these
responses were excluded. Supporting the heterosexual-as-default hypothesis, all other
participants in the default and heterosexual-specific conditions reported thinking about
heterosexual couples.However, only aminority of participants in the lesbian-specific, and
half of participants in the gay-specific condition, reported thinking about the specified
same-gender couple during the task.
Discussion
In Study 1 heterosexual-identified participants conceptualized default and sexuality-
specific concepts of love in overlapping ways. Consistent with the heterosexual-by-
default hypothesis, the default concept of romantic love resembled the concept generated
by those thinking about heterosexual couples more than it resembled the concept of
Table 3. Rank correlations [and 95% confidence intervals] between feature generations in each
condition, among heterosexual (Study 1), lesbian/gay male, and bisexual participants (Study 2)
Condition
Default Heterosexual-specific Lesbian-specific
Study 1: Heterosexual participants
Heterosexual-specific .75a [.66, .82]
Lesbian-specific .57b [.44, .68] .48a [.34, .60]
Gay-specific .59b [.47, .69] .55a [.42, .66] .68 [.58, .76]
Study 2: Lesbian/Gay Male participants
Heterosexual-specific .56a [.45, .66]
Lesbian-specific .43b [.30, .54] .49a [.37, .60]
Gay-specific .57a [46, .66] .45a [.32, .56] .49 [.37, .60]
Study 2: Bisexual participants
Heterosexual-specific .59a [.48, .68]
Lesbian-specific .55a [.44, .65] .42a [.29, .54]
Gay-specific .56a [.45, .66] .45a [.32, .56] .49 [.37, .60]
Note. Correlations thatdonot sharea subscriptwithin rowsare significantlydifferent (p < .05, Fisher’sZ).
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generated by those thinking about either lesbian women or gay male relationships.
Tellingly, participants who were asked to conceptualize same-gender love were more
likely both to drop-out, and to report thinking about heterosexual relationships. Together,
these patterns suggest that participants found it more difficult to access and report their
knowledge of same-gender relationships.
Study 2: Feature generation among lesbian, gay and bisexual participants
Results of Study 1 were consistent with our heterosexual-by-default hypothesis, but
are open to alternative explanations. Given that participants were heterosexual-
identified, the similarity between heterosexual-specific and default concepts could
have been caused by in-group projection from heterosexual attributes to the default
prototype (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Accordingly, Study 2 replicated Study 1
among lesbian-, gay-, and bisexual-identified people. In-group projection would be
supported only if lesbian women and gay men were to conceptualize same-gender
romantic love as closer to the default than heterosexual love. However, cultural
heterosexism can be internalized by sexual minority individuals, meaning that
heterosexual-specific concepts may resemble the default concept even for individ-
uals in these minority groups. Lesbian women and gay men understand their sexual
orientation to comprise monosexual (Anderlini-D’Onofrio & Alexander, 2009) same-
gender love and attraction, whilst bisexual people experience more of a ‘dual sexual
orientation’ (Hemmings & Blumenfeld, 1996). Accordingly, we analysed these two
sexual minority participant groups separately.
Table 4. Relationship focus by sexuality condition (%) in Studies 1–4
Type of relationship focus
Condition
Default Heterosexual Lesbian Gay male
Study 1
Heterosexual 97 98 66 46
Homosexual 0 0 26 43
Study 2
Gay/Lesbian participants
Heterosexual 3 76 0 5
Homosexual 93 24 95 95
Bisexual participants
Heterosexual 65 71 16 29
Homosexual 29 6 74 62
Study 3
Heterosexual 100 97 77 69
Lesbian 11 0 62 20
Gay Male 9 0 21 69
Study 4
Heterosexual – 97 94 93
Lesbian – 14 63 25
Gay Male – 22 20 68
Note. In Studies 1–2, participants had to select one option, whereas in Studies 3–4, participants could
select more than one option.
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Method
Participants
As in Study 1, we aimed to recruit 200 participants, via UK-based research websites,
Facebook groups, the researchers’ social networks, and Prolific.ac. Participants were
unaware that we were only recruiting LGB participants. As with Study 1, participants were
only informed that we were interested in their perceptions of romantic love. Among 587
respondents, 281 left the survey incomplete. We excluded participants with heterosexual-
identified (n = 81) or unreported (n = 7) sexual orientation, or who failed to follow
instructions (n = 16). The final sample included 99 female, 90 male, 11 non-binary, two
unspecified participants (see Table 1 for self-identified ethnic background) aged 18–60
(M = 28.81, SD = 8.96). Participants self-identified as lesbian or gay (n = 98), bisexual
(n = 74), andnon-heterosexual (n = 30).Most (n = 111) receivedcompensationofGBP£1.
Materials and procedure
The design, measures and procedure were identical to Study 1. Participants were
randomly assigned to the default (n = 51), heterosexual-specific (n = 50), lesbian-
specific (n = 50), or gay-specific condition (n = 51).
Coding
The coding procedure was identical to Study 1. Two independent judges coded 2,480
items using the 119 codes fromRegan et al. (1998). Undecipherable responses, synonyms
of love, and messages to the experimenter were excluded (n = 78). The resulting 2,402
items were assigned to 231 categories: 110 of Regan et al.’s codes and 121 new categories
(e.g.,meeting families/friends, polyamory, knowing the partner). Inter-rater reliability
was very high (Krippendorff’s a =.97); in the few unresolved discrepancies, the first
judge’s code was used. Unique items generated only once were excluded (n = 58),
leaving 173 features. Aswith Study 1, the feature frequencies (i.e., number of participants
generating each feature) operationalized each prototype.
Results
Overall, LGB participants generated a large number of unique features of love that were
not generated by Study 1’s heterosexual participants (e.g., monogamy, freedom; see
Supplementary Materials), indicating distinct features of LGB participants’ representa-
tions of romantic love that are not shared by the heterosexual sample. Unlike Study 1, the
average number of features generated per participant did not differ between conditions (F
(3, 198) = .88, p = .45, 2 = .01).4
As in Study 1, we calculated Spearman’s Rho correlations between the four conditions’
feature frequencies, separately by sexual identity group (Table 3).5 Among lesbian women
and gay men, feature frequencies in the default condition correlated significantly more
strongly with those in the heterosexual-specific condition than with those in the lesbian-
specific condition (z = 1.68, p = .047), but not those in the gay-specific condition (z = .04,
p = .48). Also, feature frequencies in the default condition correlated significantly more
4 These results remain non-significant when testing differences within self-identified sexuality groups (e.g., lesbians).
5 Participants who did not identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual (n = 4–9 per condition) were not included in this analysis.
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strongly with those in the gay-specific condition than with those in the lesbian-specific
condition (z = 1.72, p = .04). Thus, among self-identified lesbian women and gay men,
heterosexual love and gay love overlapped equivalently with the default concept, and both
overlapped with it more than the lesbian concept did. Among bisexual participants,
correlations between feature frequencies across all conditions did not differ (ps > .56).
As with Study 1, chi-square tests compared frequency of generation of the 31 features
mentioned by at least 10% of participants in the heterosexual condition to the frequencies
of the same features in the lesbian-specific and gay-specific conditions. No significant
differences emerged for any of these features across conditions after Bonferroni
correction, for either lesbian/gay male or bisexual participants. Notably, unlike Study 1,
the number of participants referencing gender and sexuality did not differ significantly
between conditions for either lesbian/gay male (v2(3) = 5.34, p = .15) or bisexual
participants (v2(3) = 3.85, p = .28).
Relationship focus
In contrast to Study 1’s heterosexual participants, most sexual minority participants
reported focusing on the specified couple type in all sexuality-specific conditions
(Table 4). Also, in the default condition, lesbianwomen and gaymen almost all focused on
same-gender love most often, whilst a majority of bisexual participants focused on
heterosexual love.
Discussion
In contrast to the heterosexual-identified participants in Study 1, LGB participants had no
difficulty in calling tomind diverse couples. Lesbians’ and gaymen’s default prototypes of
romantic love overlappedwith concepts of heterosexual and gaymale relationships,more
than they overlapped with concepts of lesbian relationships. The findings indicate a
pattern of intersecting category norms more subtle than either simple cultural
heterosexism or in-group projection predictions. We return to this point in the General
Discussion. Bisexual people’s default concepts overlapped to a similar extent with all
sexual orientation-specific concepts, perhaps reflecting the experience of being attracted
to more than one gender in a monosexual world (Meyer & Wilson, 2009).
Studies 3 and 4 examinedmore closely the roles of long-term knowledge and cognitive
activation in explaining the heterosexual default concepts of romantic love among
heterosexual people.
Study 3: Feature ratings among heterosexual participants
Study 1 found default and sexual orientation-specific concepts of romantic love to be
distinct but overlapping in a feature-generation task. In Study 3 participants rated the
importance of features of romantic love in a four-condition design that resembled Studies
1 and 2 (feature rating). Previous research has indicated medium to high correlations
between concepts inferred from the feature-generation task used in Studies 1 and 2 and
feature ratings elicited in Study 3 (rs ~.30–.58; see Fehr, 1988; Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper
et al., 2012). Unlike feature generation, feature rating is not affected by the accessibility of
the feature in long-term memory (Higgins, 1996). As such, a conceptual replication of
Study 1’s patterns in a feature-rating task would suggest that cultural heterosexism is a
consequenceof difference inparticipants’ long-termmemory representations of romantic
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couples. A null result would point instead to the possibility that cultural heterosexism
arises during category activation, due to the different accessibility of sexual orientation-
specific concepts of romantic love.
Method
Participants
Our recruitment target and strategy followed those of Study 1. As with Studies 1 and 2,
participants were only informed that the study was about romantic love. Of 437
respondents, 239 left the survey incomplete. Attrition, though lower than Study 1, was
again higher in the lesbian- and gay-specific conditions (49%) than the default and
heterosexual-specific conditions (38%; v2(1) = 4.62, p = .03). We excluded participants
whose sexual orientation was non-heterosexual (n = 35) or unreported (n = 9). The
drop-out rate left the sample smaller than projected (N = 154; 82% female; aged 17–62,
M = 27.61, SD = 9.24). See Table 1 for details of participants’ self-identified ethnic
backgrounds.
Materials and procedure
The online survey software randomly assigned participants to default (n = 45), heterosex-
ual-specific (n = 39), lesbian-specific (n = 34), or gay-specific (n = 36) conditions.
Participants viewed 50 features of romantic love, including the 46 most frequently
generated features overall in Study 1 and four features generated more often in the lesbian-
and gay-specific conditions than in the default and heterosexual-specific conditions of Study
1 (e.g., gender and sexuality). Following opening instructions as in Study 1 (adapted from
Regan et al., 1998), participants in the default condition were asked for each feature to
‘indicate howcentral (important or essential) you think it is to the concept of ‘romantic love’
(1 = not at all important, 7 = very important). Participants in the three sexual orientation-
specific conditions were additionally prompted to think about the relevant target group.
Finally, to assess Relationship Focus, participants were asked to indicate all the relationship
types that they were thinking about (heterosexual, gay, lesbian). Participants also reported
their age, occupation, and self-identified gender and ethnicity.
Results
Ratings
After excluding two multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis Distance > critical chi-square
[df = 7]), the mean rating for each feature in each condition was calculated. Overall,
ratings varied considerably across features, with some rated extremely prototypical, or
central (e.g., happiness) and others less prototypical, or peripheral (e.g., shyness; see
SupplementaryMaterials formean rating of each feature).6 Taking the feature rating as the
6 A MANCOVA analysis was conducted with sexuality condition as the IV, the 50 features of love as the DV, and age, gender
(Female vs. Male vs. Other), and occupation (Student vs. Other) as covariates. Gender emerged significant (p = .016) because
male participants generally gave slightly higher ratings than female participants. Age also emerged as significant covariate
(p = .025); younger participants were found to give higher ratings than older participants. However, even when the covariates
variables were controlled for, no significant differences emerged between sexual orientation conditions. We did not include
ethnicity as we did not want to take away from people’s self-identifications, this variable was simply used to get a better idea of the
characteristics of our sample.
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unit of analysis, we calculated Spearman’s Rho correlations between conditions
(Table 5). Two informative findings warrant comment. First, all correlations were very
high, indicating near-identical conceptual structure across default and sexual orientation-
specific conditions. Fisher’s Exact Z-Test showed that none differed significantly. Second,
correlations between the frequencies of generation of these 50 features in Study 1 and
their respective ratings in Study 3 were moderate, replicating prior findings that the
concepts derived from feature-generation and feature-rating tasks are not identical.
Relationship focus
All participants in the default and heterosexual-specific conditions reported thinking
about heterosexual couples, whilst few reported thinking about lesbian or gay couples
(Table 4). In the lesbian- and gay-specific conditions, most participants reported thinking
about both heterosexual and relevant same-gender couples, whilst a few reported
thinking about condition-irrelevant same-gender couples. Notably, a higher number of
participants indicated thinking a heterosexual relationship in the lesbian-specific
condition than in the gay-specific condition, similar to Study 1.
Discussion
Study 3 showed no differences between sexual orientation-specific and default concepts.
This finding suggests that the differences between conditions observed in Study 1 were
likely a consequenceof category activationdifferences.Distinct but overlapping concepts
were elicited by feature-generation and feature-rating tasks across the two experiments as
in past research. Jointly, Studies 1 and 3 suggest that heterosexual people can
conceptualize love among same-gender couples, but that such concepts are harder to
access, leading to a greater overlap between heterosexual and default conceptions of
romantic love category features must be accessed. Study 4 examined category activation
effects directly.
Study 4: Feature accessibility among heterosexual participants
Study 4 investigated heterosexual participants’ activation of romantic love
concepts after being prompted (or not) with sexual orientation-specific concepts.
Participants performed timed forced-choice tasks in which they verified whether
features were relevant or not to default and sexual orientation-specific prototypes
of romantic love (Fehr, 1988; Hepper et al., 2012). This speeded feature-
verification task was more cognitively demanding than the untimed feature-rating
task in Study 3, but did not require the recruitment of exemplars as did the
feature-generation task in Study 1.
Each participant completed two tasks, in which they verified features to the default
concept of love, and to one of three sexual orientation-specific concepts of love (i.e.,
heterosexual-, gay- or lesbian-specific). We measured the number of features verified by
participants to assess the breadth of their concepts in each task. We predicted that
participants would verify more features in the heterosexual-specific condition than in the
other sexual orientation-specific conditions. We used reaction times to examine if the
matching task created a similar or different cognitive load across tasks (Fehr, 1988;Hepper
et al., 2012). As in past research,we identified central and peripheral features of romantic
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love for use as stimuli using a median split of feature ratings from Study 3 (Fehr, 1988;
Hassebrauck, 1997).
Crucially, we manipulated the order of the two tasks, to examine possible effects of
activating one representation of romantic love on another (see also Herr, Sherman, &
Fazio, 1983). Participants completed either the default task or a sexual orientation-specific
task first. This design first allowed for comparisons of the default and sexuality-specific
concepts activated by the first task. Second, this design allowed a test of the effect of
activating the first concept on the second concept. We anticipated that when default
concepts of love are activated first, participants would distinguish less between sexual
orientation-specific concepts in the second task, as the activated default concept would
be similar across conditions. In contrast, when sexual orientation-specific concepts are
activated first, we anticipated that there would be differences between the different
sexual orientation conditions (as in Study 1), and these differences would affect the
default task as theywill be interpreting the task in terms of their already activated concept.
Method
Participants
Weaimed to recruit asmanyparticipants aswecouldwithin the academic semester (or year,
depending). A sensitivity analysis with .80 power indicated that the obtained sample
provides enough power to detect an effect size of .30 across the three sexual orientation
conditions andaneffect sizeof .27 across the twoorder conditions. Theobtained sample size
alsohas sufficient power to detect an interaction effect size of .21.We recruited 137 students
and staff at a UK university in exchange for £5 (n = 64) or course research-participation
token (n = 73). Participants were only informed that the study was about romantic love.
Participants were excluded if they identified as non-heterosexual (n = 15) or engaged in
random button-pressing, meaning they gave the same response to every trial (n = 10). The
final sample comprised 112 heterosexual-identified participants (85% female, age 18–54,
M = 21.54, SD = 5.64). See Table 1 for details of participants’ self-identified ethnic
backgrounds.
Design
Study 4had a 3 (sexual orientation-specific task) 9 2 (task order) design. All participants
completed the default task and one of three sexual orientation-specific tasks (i.e.,
Table 5. Rank correlations [and 95% confidence intervals] in ratings of features between sexuality
conditions (Study 3) and between ratings and respective feature-generation frequencies from Study 1
Study 3 ratings by condition
Default Heterosexual Lesbian Gay male
Study 3 ratings
Default – .96 [.93, .98] .96 [.93, .98] .97 [.95, .98]
Heterosexual – .95 [.91, .97] .96 [.93, .98]




.55 [.44, .64] .46 [.34, .57] .52 [.41, .62] .54 [.43, .64]
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heterosexual-, lesbian-, or gay-specific), with the order of these two tasks randomly
assigned. Within each task, participants verified central, peripheral, and distractor
features. The percentage of features verified, and the mean reaction time to verify those
features, were the main dependent variables.
Materials and procedure
The task was presented using E-Prime v2.0. Prior to the main blocks, participants
completed a 40-trial practice block. Each task (default and sexual orientation-specific) had
101 trials, presented in two blocks. The trials included 50 features of romantic love from
Study 3 (the feature Gender and Sexualitywas decomposed into two items; gender and
sexuality). These 51 items were categorized as central (n = 25) or peripheral (n = 26).
The remaining 50 items were distractors unrelated to love.
Participants were instructed in each trial to indicate as quickly as possible whether or
not each feature was associated with the relevant concept of romantic love. Each feature
appeared in the centre of the screen and remained until the participant responded using
the ‘P’ and ‘Q’ keys (counterbalanced across participants). Finally, participants completed
metacognitive and demographic items. Participants also reported their age, occupation,
and self-identified gender and ethnicity.
Results
Transformation and screening
Latencies below300 ms and above 3,000 ms, indicating extremely fast or slow responses,
were recoded to 300 and 3,000 ms, respectively (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).
Only reaction times for correctly verified responses (i.e., ‘yes’ responses) were analysed
following previous prototype research (e.g., Hepper et al., 2012). A logarithmic
transformation was applied to all variables.
Feature verification
Consistent with prior prototype research, participants verified more central features
(M = 95.75%, SD = 3.95) than peripheral features (M = 76.01%, SD = 12.31; z = 8.85,
p < .001), and more peripheral features than distractor features (M = 2.66%, SD = 3.90;
z = 9.19, p < .001). These results confirmed the categorization of features as central or
peripheral. We did not analyse responses to the distractor features further.
To test ourmain hypotheses,we conducted a 3 (Sexual orientation-Specific Condition:
Heterosexual, Lesbian, Gay Male) 9 2 (Task Order: Default First, Sexual orientation-
Specific First) 9 2 (Feature Type: Central, Peripheral) 9 2 (Task Number: First, Second)
mixed-ANOVA. A large Feature Typemain effect was observed; participants verifiedmore
central (M = 95.75, SD = 3.95) than peripheral features (M = 76.01, SD = 12.31; F
(1,106) = 287.03, p < .001, g2 = .73).
Two significant interactions were observed. There was a significant interaction
between Feature Type 9 Task Number (F(1,106) = 13.90, p < .001, g2 = .12) which
was qualified by a significant four-way interaction involving all factors (F(2,106) = 4.36,
p = .02, g2 = .08). Accordingly, and reflecting our hypotheses about the impact of
category activation inTask 1 onTask 2,we interpreted this interactionby splitting the data
by feature type and order condition. In other words, for each of the four intersections of
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feature type (central vs. peripheral) and order conditions (i.e., default first vs. sexual
orientation-specific first), we conducted a 2 (Task Number) 9 3 (Sexual orientation-
Specific Condition) ANOVA on the percentage of features verified (see Table 6 for
means).
We found no effects of task number or sexual orientation-specific condition on the
percentage of central features verified in either of the order conditions. Participants
verified equivalent central features across blocks and across sexual orientation conditions,
regardless of whether they completed a sexual orientation-specific task first (Fs < 1.58,
ps > .21) or completed the default task first (Fs < 1, ps > .48). Endorsement of the most
central concepts of romantic love did not vary across task, order, or sexual orientation
condition.
Next, we analysed the verification of peripheral features (Table 6). In the sexual
orientation-specific task first conditions, we observed a main effect of sexual orientation
condition (F(2,57) = 4.21, p = .02, g2 = .13). Planned contrasts found that the hetero-
sexual-specific concept was attributed significantly more peripheral features than the gay
and lesbian-specific concepts (t(30.44) = 2.82, p = .008). We observed no effect of task
number (F(1,57) = 2.53, p = .12, g2 = .04). These results imply that participants called
tomind different sexual orientation-specific concepts in the absence of other prompts, as
predicted (and in line with Study 1). Moreover, the lack of any task number by condition
interaction implies that concepts remained distinct between conditions even during the
second, default task. It seems that in this condition, different sexual orientation-specific
concepts were activated in the first task, and shaped the subsequently activated ‘default’
concept.
We turned to the verification of peripheral features in the default task first conditions
(Table 6, upper panel). Participants verified significantly fewer peripheral features in the
first (default) task (M = 75.74%, SD = 13.76) than in the second (sexual orientation-
specific) task (M = 78.18%, SD = 12.35), (F(1,49) = 7.69, p = .01, g2 = .14). However,
there was no main effect of sexual orientation-specific condition (F(2,49) = .19, p = .85,
g2 = .01), or condition 9 task number interaction (F(2,57) = 1.78, p = .18, g2 = .07).
Participants all completed the default task in this first trial and unsurprisingly did not differ
in the number of concepts they recruited. In the second task, all concepts of romantic love
were broader, but did not differ across sexual orientation conditions. As a consequence,
lesbian- and gay-specific concepts were broader here than when sexual orientation-
specific concepts were elicited first. Indeed, participants who conceptualized gay or
lesbian romantic love after first conceptualizing the default concept verified 7% more
peripheral features than those who conceptualized gay or lesbian romantic love as their
first task (Table 6).
Reaction times
We examined reaction times using a 3 (Sexual orientation-Specific Condition: Hetero-
sexual, Lesbian, Gay Male) 9 2 (Task Order: Default First, Sexual orientation-Specific
First) 9 2 (Feature Type: Central, Peripheral) 9 2 (Task Number: First, Second) mixed-
ANOVA. Participants responded faster to central features (M = 862.66 ms,
SD = 179.70 ms) than to peripheral features (M = 970.36 ms, SD = 233.89 ms; F
(1,106) = 91.28, p < .001, g2 = .46), consistent with prototype theory. Participants also
responded faster as they moved from the first task (M = 959.57 ms, SD = 233.32 ms) to
the second task (M = 873.45 ms, SD = 184.72 ms; F(1,106) = 52.71, p < .001,
g2 = .33), consistent with a practice effect.
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These effectswere qualified by two interactions. First, a Feature Type 9 TaskNumber
interaction (F(1,106) = 10.09, p = .002, g2 = .087) was observed. Participants
responded faster to central features than peripheral features in all conditions, but this
effect was weaker when the sexual orientation-specific tasks were completed first
(d = .41) than when the default tasks were completed first (d = .55; ps < .001). In other
words, participants were hadmore restricted concepts in the first trial, particularly if they
completed a sexual orientation-specific task first. Second, a Task Order 9 Task Number
interaction (F(1,106) = 12.72, p = .001,g2 = .11) was observed. The difference in speed
of responses was greater in the task completed first (d = .51) than the task completed
second (d = .32; ps < .001). Furthermore, this practice effect was larger when the sexual
orientation-specific task was completed first than when the default task was first. This
suggests a greater effect of category activation when participants moved from a sexual
orientation-specific task to the default task than the reverse.7 There were no significant
main effects or interactions involving sexual orientation-specific conditions (ps > .58).
Discussion
In Study 4, participants conceptualized sexual orientation-specific love as both different,
and as similar, depending upon conditions in a timed feature-verification task. Participants
who first conceptualized sexual orientation-specific love recruited the broadest concepts
in regard to heterosexual-specific love (mirroring Study 1), and these differences persisted
when they subsequently conceptualized a default conception of romantic love. However,
when the default concept of love was assessed first, it led participants to verify a similar
number of features to when they subsequently conceptualized romantic love between
any of the three couples. As a consequence, the lesbian- and gay-specific concepts were
more inclusive when they were constructed after calling to mind the default concept,
compared to when they were recruited first.
Reaction time data suggest no difference in the ease of bringing sexuality-specific
concepts to mind, and that all concepts became more accessible across tasks. Moreover,
participants sped up across the experiment more when responding to peripheral than
central features, and more where sexual orientation-specific concepts were recruited
first. Sexual orientation-specific concepts looked most distinct in this experiment in the
sexual orientation-specific conditions and in regard to these peripheral features. Calling to
mind sexual orientation-specific concepts particularly facilitated the activation of
somewhat different default conceptions of romantic love.
General discussion
Four studies showed how heterosexual-identified people can conceptualize love as
equivalent irrespective of romantic partners’ genders, but sometimes find it cognitively
effortful to do so. Results of three different cognitive experiments suggest that although
heterosexual-identified participants can fairly match the features of romantic love to
lesbian and gay couples (Study 3), the concepts of love that they recruit under more
effortful conditions can be sexual orientation-specific (Studies 1 and 4). Unlike LGB
7 In Study 4, aMixed ANCOVA analysis testing the covariates of age, gender (Female vs. Male vs. Other), and occupation (Student
vs. Other) found no significant covariates for either feature verification or reaction times. There were no interactions any of the
three demographic variables and any of the IVs for feature verification. For reaction times, age interacted with trial number, but
there were no interactions between sexual orientation-specific condition and any demographic variable.
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participants, heterosexual-identified participants were the only group who showed a
unique overlap between a default conception of love and one that was specific to their
own sexual orientation group (Studies 1–2). Heterosexual participants were also
disproportionately reluctant to remain in studies in which they were asked to
conceptualize same-gender love. Finally, heterosexual-identified participants, unlike
their LGB counterparts, struggled to hold same-gender loving couples in mind when they
did remain in those studies (Studies 1–3). These findings suggest that cultural
heterosexism may be instantiated at the cognitive level by differences in the ease of
accessing equivalent concepts of love when thinking about diverse romantic couples.
Consistent with Herek’s (2007) claims about cultural heterosexism, and Kahneman
and Miller’s (1986) norm theory, these experiments explain how a common and higher-
status feature such as heterosexuality can be ‘conflated with’ or ‘assumed to be’ the norm
in social, political, and everyday discourse. They add to recent findings that explanations
of differences between couples frame heterosexual couples as the linguistic norm, thus
making group inequalities appear more legitimate (Hegarty et al., 2020). Herek also
emphasized that cultural heterosexism was long-standing but malleable. By demonstrat-
ing variability in the cognitive instantiation of the same concept by task, the present
research illustrates that ideological point at the level of category activation, showing how
and why ‘romantic love’ can be conceptualized in limited cultural heterosexist or
heteronormative terms, and conceptualized in more inclusive terms. In other words, our
findings suggest that cultural heterosexism shapes the accessibility of LGB exemplars
(Higgins, 1996).
In developing concepts of love, people may draw upon their experiences in their in-
group. However, the tendency to take heterosexual couples as default should not simply
be attributed to in-group projection, motivated by social identity concerns, particularly
because lesbian and gay male participants, continued to recruit heterosexual couples as
the default (Study 2). In addition, recruiting both in-group-specific concepts and out-
group-specific concepts influenced subsequent default concepts of romantic love among
heterosexual participants (Study 3). This flexibility in the categories that people can
access cannot, on its own, explain why heterosexuality might be the default norm for
romantic love in some contexts. In addition to such proximal cognitive factors, it seems
necessary to also invoke distal factors that structure the social environment in ways that
position heterosexuality as a default norm, as LGBT psychologists have long argued to be
the case. To do this it is additionally necessary to consider social cognition as occurring not
in a vacuum but in an ideological context in which certain forms of relationship are
positioned as more normative than others.
Of course, lesbian- and gay-specific concepts may also be harder to call to mind for
heterosexual participants, but not LGB-identified participants, because these social
identity labels overlay real differences in life experience, which also inform concepts.
Rich accounts of such life experiences are beyond our cognitive studies, but LGB-identity
formation has long been conceptualized as a process of creating a worldview that is
epistemologically centred on the LGB identity rather than heterosexual norms (Cass,
1979; Johnson, 2015). The influence of cultural heterosexism on the psychology of sexual
minority individuals is most often described as occurring through the internalization of
negative cultural attitudes about sexual minorities (e.g., Meyer, 2003). However,
cognitive processes can impact members of stigmatized groups without internalization
(Biernat & Deaux, 2012). In our studies, LGB individuals reported no difficulty in calling
diverse couples to mind, but gay-specific love was closer to the default concept than
lesbian-specific love for lesbian and gay participants. LGB individuals’ concepts may now
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be affected by a ‘homonormative’ ideology resulting from impactful resistance to cultural
heterosexism that has centred the identities of more privileged LGB subgroups of people
(e.g., white middle-class men; Duggan, 2002). This interpretation is consistent with
Petsko and Bodenhausen’s (2019) findings that cultural defaulting resulted in some social
groups being harder to bring to mind as members of social categories than others. Both
media analyses and related studies of category norm representations suggest that gaymale
couplesmaybebetter represented than lesbian couples in understandings ofmarriage and
divorce (Hegarty et al., 2020).
It is important to note themodest sample sizes in some studies here which suggest the
need for replication and extension of this work. To our knowledge, these studies are the
first to compare the overlap between default and more specific prototypes of an emotion
concept, and we recruited in anticipation of observing medium size effects (Cohen,
1992). Further, like many studies that study heterosexism, participants were largely
drawn from the UK and USA, where attitudes towards sexual minorities have improved in
recent decades (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). Also, the majority of our sample self-
identified as Caucasian and female, which precluded analysis of gender or ethnicity
effects. Studies of heterosexism among men in less-liberal national contexts may more
appropriately address other levels of analysis than individual cognition (Bartos et al.,
2014; West, 2018). Although our studies were conducted in a more liberal context,
political views can still have an influence on a more individual level. Further research
could also benefit from examining political orientation prior to questions on sexual
orientation groups. Conservatives may feel more threatened by imagining same-sex
behaviours (Mooijman& Stern, 2016) and find taking the perspective of same-gender love
particularly difficult. This could explain the high drop-out rates in Studies 1 and 3.We also
need to be cautious of the generalizability of our sample in Study 2. Following the advice of
Herek et al. (1991), we used a variety of recruitment strategies; however, our results are
based on opportunity samples of those LGB individuals who engage with universities and
Prolific academic and should not be generalized to all LGB individuals.
Much research on romantic relationships makes normative assumptions about those
relationship forms, including the assumption that romantic love occurs first and foremost
in heterosexual contexts (Thorne, et al., 2019). We argue that research on prototypes of
love, such as the work presented here, allows psychologists to examine empirically the
gap between existing conceptualizations of love in the literature and the conceptualiza-
tions of lay individuals (Kelley, 1992). Other default characteristics or relationships, such
as monogamous relationships, ‘love marriages,’ or age-discordant relationships could be
analysed using a similar approach. In these cases, prototype research can advance
understanding by moving such taken-for-granted default features out of the background
and examining the process of defaulting itself.
Limitations notwithstanding, the present findings have implications for understanding
and addressing the consequences of cultural heterosexism. As cultural heterosexism
influences category accessibility, it may well be the case that heterosexuality, like
Whiteness, is associated with some overarching national groups in implicit representa-
tions (cf. Devos & Banaji, 2005). Our finding that activating a superordinate category
impacts subsequent sexual orientation-specific categorization implies that presenting
same-gender couples as general examples of romantic love could be beneficial (see
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). Further research should also examine the impact of
activating non-typical same-gender couples on attitudes via cognitive processes such as
the experience of disfluency and surprise (West & Bruckm€uller, 2013). In sum, as some
societies approach legal equality for same-gender couples, our research shows how social
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cognition can contribute to both the description and explanation of ‘hierarchy-
enhancing’ ideologies (Pratto, 1999) that lag behind. By studying how taken-for-granted
concepts (such as love) have developed in suchminority groups,we could unlock awider
understanding of these concepts and a deeper understanding of ‘equality’.
Acknowledgments
This researchwas conducted inpartial fulfilment of the requirements of a PhD thesis by thefirst
author under the supervision of the second and third authors.Wewould like to thank Geoffrey
Haddock for providing constructive feedback on this paper, and Katy Kennedy, Sonal Malkan,
Annette Smith, Tadgh Bogan-Carey, and Aaron Garlick for help with coding.
Conflicts of interest
All authors declare no conflict of interest.
Author contributions
Sapphira Thorne, PhD (Conceptualization; Data curation; Formal analysis; Investigation;
Methodology; Project administration; Resources; Software; Validation; Visualization;
Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing) Peter Hegarty (Conceptualization;
Data curation; Investigation; Methodology; Project administration; Resources; Supervi-
sion; Validation; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing) Erica Hepper
(Conceptualization; Investigation; Methodology; Project administration; Resources;
Supervision; Validation; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing)
Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available inOSF at http://doi.org/10.
17605/OSF.IO/52ZWN.
References
Anderlini-D’Onofrio, S., & Alexander, J. (2009). Introduction to the special issue: Bisexuality and
queer theory: Intersections, diversions, and connections. Journal of Bisexuality, 9, 197–212.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15299710903316489
Ansara, Y. G., & Hegarty, P. (2012). Cisgenderism in psychology: Pathologising and misgendering
children from 1999 to 2008. Psychology & Sexuality, 3, 137–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/
19419899.2011.576696
Bailey, A. H., LaFrance,M., &Dovidio, J. F. (2019). Isman themeasure of all things? A social cognitive
account of androcentrism. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 23, 307–331. https://d
oi.org/10.1177/1088868318782848
Bartos, S. E., Berger, I., &Hegarty, P. (2014). Interventions to reduce sexual prejudice: A study-space
analysis and meta-analytic review. The Journal of Sex Research, 51, 363–382. https://doi.org/
10.1080/00224499.2013.871625
Bell, D., & Binnie, J. (2000). The sexual citizen: Queer politics and beyond. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
674 Sapphira R. Thorne et al.
Biernat, M., & Deaux, K. (2012). 22 A history of social psychological research on gender. In A. W.
Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Handbook of the history of social psychology (pp. 475–498).
New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Bodenhausen, G. V., & Peery, D. (2009). Social categorization and stereotyping in vivo: The VUCA
challenge. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3, 133–151. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1751-9004.2009.00167.x
Bruckm€uller, S., Hegarty, P., Teigen, K. H., B€ohm, G., & Luminet, O. (2017). When do past events
require explanation? Insights from social psychology. Memory Studies, 10, 261–273. https://d
oi.org/10.1177/1750698017701607
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. London, UK:
Routledge.
Cass, V. C. (1979). Homosexual identity formation: A theoretical model. Journal of Homosexuality,
4, 219–235. https://doi.org/10.1300/J082v04n03_01
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155–159. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-2909.112.1.155
Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: Combating
automatic prejudicewith images of admired anddisliked individuals. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 81, 800–814. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.800
de Lauretis, T. (1991). Queer theory, lesbian and gay studies: An introduction. Differences: A
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 3, iii–xviii.
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). American=white? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88, 447–466. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.447
Duggan, L. (2002). Thenewhomonormativity: The sexual politics of neoliberalism. InR.Castronovo
& D. D. Nelson (Eds.), Materializing democracy: Toward a revitalized cultural politics (pp.
175–194). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Fehr, B. (1988). Prototype analysis of the concepts of love and commitment. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 55, 557–579. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.4.557
Fehr, B., & Sprecher, S. (2009). Prototype analysis of the concept of compassionate love. Personal
Relationships, 16, 343–364. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6811.2009.01227.x
Fitness, J., & Fletcher, G. J. (1993). Love, hate, anger, and jealousy in close relationships: A prototype
and cognitive appraisal analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 942–958.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.942
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile and
benevolent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the implicit
association test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 85, 197–216. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.197
Halperin, D. M. (1997). Saint Foucault: Towards a gay hagiography. Oxford, UK: Oxford
Paperbacks.
Hassebrauck, M. (1997). Cognitions of relationship quality: A prototype analysis of their structure
and consequences. Personal Relationships, 4, 163–185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6811.
1997.tb00137.x
Hegarty, P. (2017). On the failure to notice that White people are White: Generating and testing
hypotheses in the celebrity guessing game. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146,
41–62. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000243
Hegarty, P., & Bruckm€uller, S. (2013). Asymmetric explanations of group differences: Experimental
evidence of Foucault’s disciplinary power. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7,
176–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12017
Hegarty, P.,&Pratto, F. (2001). The effects of social category norms and stereotypes on explanations
for intergroup differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 723–735. https://d
oi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.80.5.723
Heterosexist prototypes of love 675
Hegarty, P., Szczerba, A., & Skelton, R. (2020). How has cultural heterosexism affected thinking
about divorce? Asymmetric framing of same-gender and mixed-gender divorces in news media
and in minds. Journal of Homosexuality, 67, 1118–1134. https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.
2019.1603495
Hemmings, C., & Blumenfeld, W. J. (1996). Reading “Monosexual”. Journal of Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 1, 311–321. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372245
Hepper, E. G., Ritchie, T. D., Sedikides, C., &Wildschut, T. (2012). Odyssey’s end: Lay conceptions
of nostalgia reflect its original Homeric meaning. Emotion, 12, 102–119. https://doi.org/10.
1037/a0025167
Herek, G. M. (2007). Confronting sexual stigma and prejudice: Theory and practice. Journal of
Social Issues, 63, 905–925. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00544.x
Herek, G. M., Kimmel, D. C., Amaro, H., & Melton, G. B. (1991). Avoiding heterosexist bias in
psychological research. American Psychologist, 44, 957–963. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.46.9.957.
Herr, P. M., Sherman, S. J., & Fazio, R. H. (1983). On the consequences of priming: Assimilation and
contrast effects. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 323–340. https://doi.org/10.
1016/0022-1031(83)90026-4
Higgins, E. T. (1996).Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T.Higgins
&A.W.Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology:Handbookof basic principles (pp. 133–168).New
York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Johnson, K. (2015). Sexuality: A psychosocial manifesto. Cambridge, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Johnson, K. L., McKay, L. S., & Pollick, F. E. (2011). He throws like a girl (but only when he’s sad):
Emotion affects sex-decoding of biological motion displays. Cognition, 119, 265–280. https://d
oi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.016
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Psychological Review, 93, 136–153. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.93.2.136
Kelley, H. H. (1992). Common-sense psychology and scientific psychology. Annual Review of
Psychology, 43, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.43.020192.000245
Kitzinger, C. (2005). Heteronormativity in action: Reproducing the heterosexual nuclear family in
after-hours medical calls. Social Problems, 52, 477–498. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2005.52.4.
477
Marchia, J., & Sommer, J. M. (2019). (Re) defining heteronormativity. Sexualities, 22, 267–295.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460717741801
McIntosh, P. (1988). White privilege and male privilege: A personal account of coming to see
correspondences through work in women’s studies. Retrieved from http://www.nymbp.org/
reference/WhitePrivilege.
Meyer, I. H. (2003). Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual
populations: Conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 674–697.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.5.674
Meyer, I. H., & Wilson, P. A. (2009). Sampling lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 56, 23–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014587
Minton, H. L. (1997). Queer theory: Historical roots and implications for psychology. Theory &
Psychology, 7, 337–353. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354397073003
Mooijman,M.,& Stern, C. (2016).Whenperspective taking creates amotivational threat: The case of
conservatism, same-sex sexual behavior, and anti-gay attitudes. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 42, 738–754. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216636633
Morrison, M. A., &Morrison, T. G. (2002). Development and validation of a scalemeasuringmodern
prejudice toward gaymen and lesbian women. Journal of Homosexuality, 43, 15–37. https://d
oi.org/10.1300/J082v43n02_02
Mummendey, A., & Wenzel, M. (1999). Social discrimination and tolerance in intergroup relations:
Reactions to intergroup difference. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 158–174.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0302_4
676 Sapphira R. Thorne et al.
Petsko, C. D., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2019). Racial stereotyping of gay men: Can a minority sexual
orientation erase race? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 83, 37–54. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jesp.2019.03.002
Pratto, F. (1999). The puzzle of continuing group inequality: Piecing together psychological, social,
and cultural forces in social dominance theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology, Vol. 31 (pp. 191–263). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Regan, P. C., Kocan, E. R., & Whitlock, T. (1998). Ain’t love grand! A prototype analysis of the
concept of romantic love. Journal of Social andPersonal Relationships,15, 411–420. https://d
oi.org/10.1177/0265407598153006
Reynolds, D. J., Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. (2006). Evidence of immediate activation of gender
information from a social role name. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59,
886–903. https://doi.org/10.1080/02724980543000088
Rosch, E. (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories. In T. E. Moore
(Ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of language (pp. 111–144). New York, NY:
Academic Press.
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 104, 192–233. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.104.3.192
Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross-cultural psychology
(volume 1) (pp. 1–72). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Rosch, E.,&Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories.
Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573–605. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(75)90024-9
Sedgwick, E. K. (2008). Epistemology of the closet. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Seidman, S. (1991). Identity and politics in a “postmodern” gay culture: Some historical and
conceptual notes. In M. Warner (Ed.), Fear of a queer planet: Queer politics and social theory
(pp. 105–142). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Thorne, S. (2018). Queer concepts of romantic love: Uncovering a heteronormative bias
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). UK: University of Surrey.
Thorne, S. R., Hegarty, P., & Hepper, E. G. (2019). Equality in theory: From a heteronormative to an
inclusive psychology of romantic love. Theory & Psychology, 29, 240–257. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0959354319826725
Turner, W. B. (2000). A genealogy of queer theory, Vol. 12. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press.
Warner, M. (Ed.). (1993). Fear of a queer planet. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
West, K. (2018). Understanding and reducing sexual prejudice in Jamaica: Theoretical and practical
insights from a severely anti-gay society. The Journal of Sex Research, 55, 472–485. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00224499.2017.1416055
West, K., & Bruckm€uller, S. (2013). Nice and easy does it: How perceptual fluency moderates the
effectiveness of imagined contact. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 254–262.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.11.007
Received 14 February 2020; revised version received 4 September 2020
Supporting Information
The following supporting informationmay be found in the online edition of the article:
Appendix A. Metacognitive and Demographic Items.
Appendix B. All features of romantic love generated by heterosexual participants in
order of total frequency (Study 1).
AppendixC.All features of romantic love generated bynon-heterosexual participants
in order of total frequency (Study 2).
Heterosexist prototypes of love 677
